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A STRIKE AGAINST THE LAW?*
TONY WEIR**
Recent experience having taught me that subjects like the Ro-
man law of property and obligations, being dead and detailed,
quickly induce ennui in the late twentieth-century mind, it seemed
right to try to find for this Gerber lecture a theme both topical and
general. The recent coal-miners' strike in England suggested itself,
though I am by no means a labour lawyer. The strike is topical
enough, for we are still trying to recover from it, and it raises the
question of the role of law in society, English or not, which is a mat-
ter surely sufficiently general. 1
The strike lasted a whole year, bar a day or two.2 It had been
preceded by a partial stoppage, an overtime ban, for four months.
The strike was not total, but two-thirds of our 180,000-odd miners
were out, and most of the pits were idle.' The cost of the strike is
very variously computed. The employer, the National Coal Board,
says in its Annual Report that the strike cost it £1,750 million.4 The
Electricity Board says the strike cost them £2,020 million, as they
had to burn oil in lieu of the 45 million tonnes of coal they could not
get. British Rail had less coal to haul, and lost £250 million, and
British Steel had less to burn and lost £180 million.5 The cost of
policing the strike is put at £200 million.6 The total cost may have
been as high as £6 billion, or nearly 2% of the gross national prod-
uct. 7 Whatever figure one selects, it is clear that the strike was no
* This paper was presented as the Lawrence I. Gerber Lecture at the University of
Maryland School of Law on October 2, 1985.
** Fellow, Trinity College; Reader in Law, Cambridge University. B.A., Cam-
bridge, 1960; M.C.L., Tulane University School of Law, 1962.
1. Chronology is provided by Pead, Diary of a Dispute, 1985 POLICE REV. 1154, nar-
rative by G. GOODMAN, THE MINERS' STRIKE (1985). Fentiman, The Courts, The Miners and
the Rule of Law, 1986 STAATKUNDIG JAARBOEK 67, starting from different premises,
reaches conclusions broadly similar to those here presented.
2. The strike lasted from early March 1984 to March 1985. See Pead, supra note 1.
3. Only 55 to 60 pits were regularly working. NATIONAL COAL BOARD, 1984-85
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 4.
4. Id. at 7. Coal sales were reduced by 64.5 million tonnes to 44 million tonnes.
5. The Costs of Victory, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1985, at 46.
6. Pead, supra note 1, at 1155. Public spending increased by £2.5 billion in 1984-85
because of the strike, and by £1.25 billion the following year by reason of its after-
effects. The Times (London), Nov. 19, 1985, at 23, col. 3.
7. According to figures released by the Government's chief economic advisor, an
estimated total of £5-6 billion is broadly correct. The Times (London), Nov. 19, 1985,
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small deal.
There were not many deaths. One picket died on 15 March
1984; another was fatally run over two months later.8 One working
miner, Jim Clay, was edged into suicide by harassment and threats.
David Wilkie, a cab driver, was killed on 30 November while driving
a miner to work:9 a striking miner dropped a block of concrete on
to Wilkie's cab from a bridge over the motorway.' 0 Of non-fatal vio-
lence there was a great deal. Nearly 1,400 policemen were injured,
85 severely. There were 2,000 arrests for assault or criminal dam-
age, and 682 miners were fired for violence or sabotage." The cars
of 200 working miners were damaged on 7 August when a mob of
1,000 striking miners from a neighbouring county attacked their
pits.12 There was much intimidation, obstruction, and breach of the
peace. It was not all loss, of course. There was the human gain of
the strong sense of solidarity felt where all the miners were on
strike, the warm cohesiveness of feeling exploited and beleaguered
together; but as against that there was all the rancour of civil war
where some miners were still trying to work.'" Bad feeling was
caused between the police and the miners, between the police and
the local police authorities (often siding with the miners), and be-
at 23, col. 4. Given the fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, determining a dollar
equivalent for this cost is at best a rough estimate. Between March 1984 and March
1985 the dollar's exchange rate varied between $1.08 and $1.49 to the British pound.
The approximate total cost of the strike was thus between $6.5 billion and $8.9 billion.
8. Pead, supra note 1, at 1154, 1155.
9. Id. at 1155, 1157.
10. The Court of Appeal reduced to manslaughter and eight years the verdict of
murder and sentence of life imprisonment imposed at the trial. See R. v. Hancock &
Shankland, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 1014 (C.A.), aft'd, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 357 (H.L.).
11. Pead, supra note 1, at 1155. The Coal Board dismissed 1,013 miners in all for
various misdemeanors; about half of them have been re-employed. National Coal
Board, Press Release (June 20, 1985). No miner was dismissed merely for striking, for
that is not normal British practice. Even when strikers are dismissed, "no matter what
the legalities are, it is the exception rather than the rule for employees who are dis-
missed during the course of a strike not to be re-engaged after the dispute is ended."
COURT OF INQUIRY UNDER RT. HON. LORD JUSTICE SCARMAN INTO A DISPUTE BETWEEN
GRUNWICK PROCESSING LABORATORIES LTD. AND MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PRO-
FESSIONAL, EXECUTIVE, CLERICAL AND COMPUTER STAFF, REPORT, CMND 5, No. 6922, at
para. 73.1 (1977).
12. Pead, supra note 1, at 1155.
13. For the sense of solidarity, see Howells, Stopping Out, in DIGGING DEEPER 139 (H.
Beynon ed. 1985); Massey & Wainwright, Beyond the Coalfields, id. at 149; Loach, We'll Be
Here to the End... and After, id. at 169. As to the civil war aspects, Ray Chadburn, Presi-
dent of the Nottinghamshire Area NUM, said, "We have brother against brother, father
against son, man against wife . . . throughout a great deal of the British coalfield." R.
GEARY, POLICING INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES: 1893-1985, at 145 (1985). The average loss to
the striking miners was £10,000. NATIONAL COAL BOARD, REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
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tween the police and the central government, which seemed in some
way to have caught the police up in a most displeasing imbroglio.' 4
Now when tempers are roused, stones will fly. Minor picket vio-
lence is inevitable-perhaps it is right not to treat it as criminal at
all' 5-though some of our miners' violence was pretty major. 6 So I
am not principally concerned about the incidental violence, though
it was this violence that primarily affected the public, agitated the
government, and alienated the other unions. What concerns me
most about the strike is that it was in large part directed against the
law itself and was marked throughout by deliberate and public con-
tempt for the law and its processes. And about this the public did
not seem to care in the very least. Although court orders were is-
sued, enjoining the Yorkshire miners from using flying pickets, fly-
ing pickets continued to be used, and to be seen to be used, for
months thereafter. 17 The courts forbade certain union officers to
move certain resolutions at a forthcoming meeting: the motions in
question were moved and carried in defiance of the court order. 18
Magistrates in the Liverpool area who were to try cases involving
pickets were told not to do so or "face the consequences."' 9 When
the courts appointed a sequestrator, miners promptly occupied his
office. No one was put in jail for flouting the law in these ways, and I
believe that the public would have been very unhappy if anyone had
been.
Now one may say that if the strike was against the law, the fact
14. See McIlroy, Police and Pickets: The Law Against the Miners, in DIGGING DEEPER, supra
note 13, at 101, 105.
15. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982), may not be used in respect of violence
during a strike to achieve legitimate collective-bargaining objectives. United States v.
Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973). Other federal criminal statutes, however, may be used.
United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
There is no analogous immunity from criminal liability in England, but in fact prosecu-
tions tend to fail. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
16. Other societies, being more vital, may be more lethal. Britain has not had any-
thing like the Yablonski murder, see B. MCCORMICK, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE COAL
INDUSTRY 66 (1978), or the Blair Mountain Battle of 1919, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1985,
at H17, col. 4. No British strike would make so poignant a novel as Mary Settle's THE
SCAPEGOAT (1980). Nevertheless, "the long-drawn-out miners' strike which began in
March 1984 was more violent than any other post-war industrial dispute." R. GEARY,
supra note 13, at 142. Geary gives the history of industrial violence in England. After
the Peterloo massacre of 1819, memorable names are Featherstone (1893, two deaths),
id. at 7-12; Tonypandy (1911, one shot); and Lianelli (1911, two shot, four killed in an
explosion), id. at 47.
17. Pead, supra note 1, at 1155; Evans, The Use of Injunctions in Industrial Disputes, 23
BRrrJ. INDUS. REL. 133, 137 (1985).
18. Clarke v. Chadburn, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 78; Pead, supra note 1, at 1154.
19. Pead, supra note 1, at 1156.
1986] 135
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
that the strike was defeated must mean a victory for the law. It is not
as clear as that. Certainly the strike was a failure: the Union ob-
tained no part of what it was demanding.20 But it is not so certain
that it was a victory for the law, though the law would have been
defeated if the strike had been successful. For it was not the law that
defeated the strike, not the state, not society, but the miners them-
selves who crept back to work. They did that because the strike was
futile, not because it was illegal.
Who were the parties? On the left, so to speak, was the Na-
tional Union of Mineworkers (NUM), our fourteenth largest union,
with 180,000 employed members, a membership down by 20%
from five years ago. 2 1 The NUM is a federation of twenty-one area
unions and a few other constituent groups, and it has a quasi-closed-
shop in the mines, though there is another union for overmen and
deputies called NACODS. 2 2 The area unions-and this is impor-
tant-retain separate identities, rule-books, and funds. On the right
was the National Coal Board. Coal was the first industry to be na-
tionalised by the postwar Labour Government in 1946, the first of a
dozen or so, some of which are now being sold back to private per-
sons and institutions. 2' The National Coal Board is a statutory cor-
poration with a monopoly of winning coal in Great Britain, with a
statutory duty to develop the industry efficiently and a statutory re-
quirement to adopt a policy which will secure that in an average year
the revenues are adequate to meet proper outgoings. 24 The Chair-
man and the Board's ten members are appointed by the Govern-
ment, and the Minister has certain powers of direction in matters
affecting the national interest and in laying down guidelines for ma-
jor reorganisations or developments.25
Now one might think that, coal mining being a nationalised in-
dustry, this was a conflict between public employees and a public
employer. That would be only half right. In our view the miners are
20. "We knew that there was going to be some price for not succeeding in the dis-
pute," said Jack Taylor, NUM (Yorkshire Area) President. The Times (London), June 8,
1985, at 1, col. 4. As to colliery closures, two more were announced during the strike
and thirteen after it. National Coal Board, Press Release (July 3, 1985). As to wages,
the original wage offer was accepted on April 11, 1985. National Coal Board, Press
Release (Apr. 11, 1985).
21. Dwindling Band of Brothers, ECONOMIST, Aug. 25, 1984, at 47.
22. National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shot Firers. See Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 16, at 61-75.
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 47-60; R. PRYKE, THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES
45-59 (1981).
24. Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 59, § 1.
25. Id. §§ 2, 3, amended by Coal Industry Act, 1973, ch. 8, sched. 1.
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not public employees at all, though that does not matter much in
itself, since we no longer have any special rules about strikes by pub-
lic employees.26 But if the employees are not public, the employer,
the National Coal Board, certainly is, and that fact wholly skews the
conflict. Everyone knows that right behind the Coal Board stands
the Government, able to meet any demand the miners may choose
to make. There was no doubt, then, that this was a strike against the
Government. After all, the Government already subsidises the coal
industry at the rate of 10% of its turnover, or £2 million per day.2 7
Why not more? Why not much more?
But the strike presented itself in terms of personalities. Here,
very much on the left, is Arthur Scargill, 47 years old, a South York-
shireman, President for Life of the Union, a talented orator and a
very effective organiser, as he had shown in previous strikes.28 Less
gifted in tongues is Ian Kinlock MacGregor, born in Scotland in
1912, educated at my own day school in Edinburgh, and now an
American citizen. After being Chairman of British Steel from 1980
to 1983, he was appointed Chairman of the Coal Board by Mrs.
Thatcher just before the overtime ban started. So valuable a pros-
pect was he that the United Kingdom agreed to pay Lazard Fr~res of
New York, where he was a partner, the sum of $2.2 million for his
services .29 Needless to say, there were frequent allegations that
MacGregor's opposition to the miners' demands was unBritish. 30
Behind the scenes was Mrs. Thatcher, a person with a certain repu-
tation for firmness and determination. I say "behind the scenes,"
but was she not perhaps in the wings, possibly even in the
prompter's box? Views differ.
If these were the personalities, what was the issue? The lapel
buttons worn by young and old (and mainly by those two classes of
citizen, so far as I could see) said it all: "Coal not Dole." The strike
26. From 1927 through 1946 established civil servants (employees of central govern-
ment) could not join a normal trade union, and the police still may not. 0. KAHN-
FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 165 (2d ed. 1977). Special rules about workers in the gas,
electrical and water industries were repealed in 1971. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch.
72, sched. 9. It is still a criminal offence for a person to break a contract of employment
knowing that to do so may well cause risk of death or serious injury to person or valua-
ble property. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86,
§ 5. No prosecution has ever been brought. Wedderburn, The New Politics of Labour Law,
in TRADE UNIONS 497, 506 (W. McCarthy 2d ed. 1985).
27. In Whose Palm?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1984, at 13.
28. See M. CRICK, SCARGILL AND THE MINERS (1985).
29. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1983, D4, at 4, col. 1.
30. Also unBritish was the use of a baseball bat by strikers on a working miner's head
on Nov. 23, 1984. Pead, supra note 1, at 1156.
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was not mainly about pay but about jobs: after all, inflation has
gone down and unemployment has gone up and up and stayed up.
3 1
The trigger was the announcement on 1 March 1984 that two col-
lieries in South Yorkshire were to be closed, followed by the news a
week later that the Coal Board planned to reduce production by
four million tonnes and cut out about 20,000 jobs.3 2 The issue was
about closing pits or keeping them open.
When should a pit be closed? The Board's view was that pits
should be closed when they cannot be run economically. The view
of the Union, tenaciously held and untiringly reiterated, was that no
pit should be closed unless it were either empty or unsafe. In other
words, if there were any coal down there that could be safely
brought up, it should be brought up, whatever the cost.3 3 Now per-
haps the view of the Coal Board required some qualification: per-
haps they were viewing economic cost too narrowly, not taking
sufficient account of the social value of increased production and the
social disvalue of reducing employment. But the Union's view was
obviously and evidently unsustainable. The Cortonwood Colliery,
one of the two nominated for closure, was 111 years old and was
losing £20 per tonne.34
The position adopted by the Union was so unmeritorious that a
question put by Barbara Tuchman may be appropriate. In her re-
cent book, The March of Folly, she reviews major instances of arrantly
stupid behaviour on the part of persons in power-the Trojans let-
ting in the Wooden Horse despite the clash of arms within; the Ren-
aissance Popes blindly failing to reform before the Reformation and
to forestall the looming Luther; the English, red in face and coat,
stubbornly alienating colonies not a million miles from here, colo-
nies, if I may say so, of considerable promise; and one more recent
instance which I forbear to mention. In observing that history af-
forded her many other examples of amazing human folly, Ms. Tuch-
man asks, "Why in recent times have British trade unions in a
31. From 1976 to 1984 inflation dropped from 16.8% to 5% and unemployment
rose from 5% to 12.6%: CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, ECONOMIC TRENDS, ANN. Supp.
1986, at 109; ECONOMIC TRENDS, Dec. 1985, at 42. In coal mining, colliery manpower
was reduced by 9,700 in 1984-1985, and by a further 7,300 in the first 12 weeks of 1985-
1986, leaving only 164,000 employed.
32. Pead, supra note 1, at 1154.
33. The views are given in Pit Closures-The Economic Issues (Weekend World, London
Weekend Television, LWT Sept. 21, 1984). History and statistics are given in PRYKE,
supra note 23, at 46-47, 56-57, and the arguments at 66-69, concluding in favour of more
closures.
34. M. CRICK, supra note 28, at 11.
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lunatic spectacle seemed periodically bent on dragging their country
towards paralysis, apparently under the impression that they are
separate from the whole?" 5
But it must be said that not everyone in England wants England
to thrive. Some want it destabilised. Spies, which it is unlawful to
be, we have had in plenty, some of the most notorious from my own
College in Cambridge, 36 and Communists, which it is perfectly law-
ful to be, we still have in numbers. Arthur Scargill's father has been
a Communist almost all his life,3 7 and Mick McGahey, the Vice-Pres-
ident of the Union, is one now, 38 though Arthur Scargill himself, an
active member of the Young Communist League, says he never
joined the actual Party.39 It is an established fact that the Party sent
one Frank Watters to South Yorkshire to activate that area in 1953:
he seems to have done well.4 ° Now there is nothing odd about the
Communists infiltrating the unions.4 ' It is an obvious thing for
them to do. If they were not doing it, they would not be doing what
they should. George Orwell saw it clearly:
The British Communist Party appears to have given up...
the attempt to become a mass party, and to have concen-
trated instead on capturing key positions, especially in the
trade unions. So long as they are not obviously acting as a
sectional group, this gives the Communists an influence
out of all proportion to their numbers.42
But leaving ulterior or collateral aims aside, could Mr. Scargill
hope to win the strike on the chosen ticket? Was the strike plausible?
Well, the miners had done pretty well against the Government in
35. B. TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY 4 (1984).
36. Sir Anthony Blunt, Donald MacLean & Kim Philby, to mention but three.
37. M. CRICK, supra note 28, at 28.
38. Id. at 89.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id. at 24.
41. "South Wales, Scotland and Kent have generally been dominated by communists
... although a communist influence in South Yorkshire only began in the fifties, and
then fitfully." B. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 63-64.
42. G. ORWELL, Burnham's View of the Contemporary World Stnggle, in 4 COLLECTED Es-
SAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS (1945-1950) 367 (1970). See also Roberts, Book Review,
23 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 163 (1985) (reviewing F. CHAPPLE, SPARKS FLY (1984)): "Over
the past sixty-five years an immense effort has been made by a tiny, but ruthlessly deter-
mined, Communist Party to capture control of the policy and actions of the trade unions
in Britain." Chapple himself was a Communist for 17 years and, having proved unable
to get the Trade Union Congress to act against the rigging of elections, invoked the
courts and alerted the public. See D. MACDONALD, THE STATE AND THE TRADE UNIONS
170, 180 (2d ed. 1976).
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the past.43 Not in 1926, admittedly, when the General Strike in their
support lasted only nine days and the miners crept back to work
badly bruised six months later.4 4 But in January 1972 the miners
struck on a 59% vote, and within a month the Government had to
declare an emergency, ration electricity, and cut the working week
to three days.45 Two weeks thereafter the Government capitulated
totally, and gave the miners even more than the generous award
recommended by an independent review body. In the words of The
Annual Register, a sober publication ever since its foundation by Ed-
mund Burke, "in a confrontation with a united and determined
trade union the Government had been forced to retreat.. . and lost
effective control of the economy.
' 4 6
Two years later the threat of another strike by the miners, 81%
of whom were for action, was enough to topple the government of
Mr. Heath and put paid to his attempt to bring industrial relations
under the law.47 The miners, along with the railwaymen and dock-
ers, got the law repealed. Even more recently the miners had em-
barrassed Mrs. Thatcher most mightily. On that occasion Mrs.
Thatcher gave in so promptly that most people have forgotten
about it, but I bet she has not. In February 1981 the Coal Board
announced a programme of pit closures. Strikes of miners broke
out in South Wales, Durham, and elsewhere. The Government im-
mediately conceded further money to the Coal Board. The list of
closures was withdrawn, and television programmes were inter-
rupted so that the grateful public might be speedily informed
thereof. The men returned to work triumphant.48 Last year a writer
in The Economist, speaking of the most recent strike, said this: "Mrs.
Thatcher did not precipitate this strike any more than did her ap-
pointee, Mr. MacGregor. But her previous surrenders to the min-
ers, and the surrenders of her predecessors, helped to cause it. ' 49
So there was a fair chance of winning concessions, if the power
43. See B. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 180-226.
44. See C. BALFOUR, UNIONS AND THE LAW 12-14 (1973); H. PELLING, A HISTORY OF
BRITISH TRADE UNIONISM 167-180 (3d ed. 1966); Goodhart, The Legality of the General
Strike in England, 36 YALE L.J. 464 (1927).
45. See C. BALFOUR, supra note 44, at 75-82; B. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 197-
209.
46. 1972 ANN. REG. 2.
47. B. MCCORMICK, supra 16, at 211-17.
48. Beynon & McMylor, Decisive Power: The New Tory State Against the Miners, in DIG-
GING DEEPER, supra note 13, at 36.
49. In Whose Palm?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1984, at 13. The writer noted that whereas
since 1964 Labour Governments had closed 335 collieries, the Conservatives had closed
only 49. Id. That number has now increased. See supra note 20.
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plants and steel mills could be closed, which would depend on a
shortage of coal and support from other unions. But there were
adverse factors. A number of mines-the most efficient-stayed
working. Stocks of coal were higher than ever before; the overtime
ban which was designed to reduce them failed to have that effect
because the winter of 1983-1984 was a mild one. The relevant prov-
erb here is "Strike while the weather is cold." Coal continued to be
imported because the dockers did not strike, except for a few days,
at the end of which irritated teamsters waiting at the English Chan-
nel threatened to throw the dockers into it unless they resumed
work.5" Finally, the Government was ready to contain disorder, for
after the trouble at Saltley near Birmingham in 1972, in which Mr.
Scargill played a notable part,5 ' the 43 police forces in the country
had set up a National Reporting Centre in New Scotland Yard which
could deploy up to 7,000 officers per day wherever they were
needed, the officers being supplied voluntarily, but not free of
charge, by quieter regions.52 The Prime Minister had power at law
to order one force to help another, 53 but quite characteristically this
power was never used.
Now let us turn to the aspects of the strike which would interest
a lawyer, its external and internal legality. I propose to read three
of the National Guidelines which the Union issued to its branches.
1. There shall be no movement of coal or coal prod-
ucts into or out of the country nor internally within the
country unless by prior agreement with the [Union] .... 54
Napoleon himself would have been proud to issue such a decla-
ration of embargo, blockade, and freeze. But this was not the ukase
of an enemy emperor. It was an assumption of power by the repre-
sentatives of 0.35% of the citizenry, actually representing, as we
shall see, rather less than half that number. Did we hear a mouse
roar?
9. Any action to restrain the Trade Union activities of
those involved in industrial action by resort to the courts
for injunction, sequestration of Union assets or damages
under the provisions of the 1980 and 1982 Employment
50. Enter, Stage Left, Confusion of Dockers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 1, 1984, at 37.
51. See B. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 206; R. GEARY, supra note 13, at 73-77; M.
CRICK, supra note 28, at 52-62.
52. Pead, Where can we get 2,000 Officers by 4 p.m.?, 1985 POLICE REV. 1212.
53. Police Act, 1964, ch. 48, § 14(2).
54. Quoted in Richard Read (Transp.) Ltd. v. NUM (South Wales Area), 1985 I.R.L.R.
67, 69, writ discharged, The Times (London), Mar. 19, 1985, at 41, col. 4.
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Acts, shall be treated as an attack upon all of the unions.55
In other words, because we are powerful, you may not exercise
your legal rights.
8. The... Committee... are further aware of the use
of massive numbers of police deployed to restrict the legiti-
mate and traditional right of workers to peaceably picket
other workers. The Committee deplore the use of the Po-
lice to enforce the Tory Government's Employment Acts of
1980 and 1982. When such action prevents the proper de-
ployment of a trade union picket, a picket shall be deemed
to exist notwithstanding the inability of trade unionists to
carry out their normal function.56
That is, a picket stopped because it is unlawful is to be treated
as both existing and lawful. Note the insistence on the statutes.
They were one of the main targets of the strike. But in fact the po-
lice were not enforcing these statutes at all, for these statutes gave
them nothing to enforce. They were applying the criminal law, most
of it old and much of it common, in an attempt to maintain or re-
store public order.5 7
When such are the aims, the methods are unlikely to be very
lawful. Flying pickets drove across the country in hordes like a pri-
vate army. Some were dispatched to steel works in order to impede
the delivery of coke and others to docks to prevent the unloading of
imported coal, but most went to other counties in order to harass
and intimidate the miners who were working there. This was espe-
cially true in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. Now in Nottingham-
shire, where Robin Hood came from, the miners had voted by more
than three to one to carry on working and not to go on strike,58 so
they were clearly entitled to work unless there were a lawful national
strike call. In Derbyshire, where they make Rolls-Royces, the local
ballot showed a nearly equal split, 50.1% against a strike, 49.9% in
favour. The local rules required a 55% vote in favour before a
strike could be called, but the local officials called a strike anyway-
quite illegally, as the courts later held.59 This manifestly illegal
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Moss v. McLachlan, 1985 I.R.L.R. 76.
58. Pead, supra note 1, at 1154.
59. Taylor v. NUM (Derbyshire Area), 1984 I.R.L.R. 440. In Taylor v. NUM (Derby-
shire Area) (No. 2), 1985 I.R.L.R. 99, the court held that union funds must no longer be
used to pay strikers for picket duty, but that sums already so disbursed need not be
repaid. Payment to the NUM by another union was permissible although the miners'
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strike call was obeyed by no less than 85% of the miners there:6"
the bulk of those who had voted against the strike nevertheless
obeyed the strike call, illegal though it was. You may imagine how
such loyalty puts union members at the mercy of their leaders. You
may imagine, too, what treatment the remaining 15% would receive
for not obeying an illegal strike call against which they and most of
their colleagues had voted.
Now of course if there had been a national ballot with the requi-
site majority in favour of a strike, the local deviations would have
been immaterial. Although the national rules provided that no na-
tional strike could be called unless 55% of the voters were in favour
of it, no national ballot was ever held. A ballot was not called even
after a special meeting had decided that a bare majority was ade-
quate. 6' The pretext for this omission was that no one should be
allowed to vote a comrade out of a job.62 The quibble was this:
"We are not calling a national strike, we are just calling the strike a
national one."63 The Union officials proceeded as if the strike were
national and lawful, and threatened working miners in Nottingham-
shire with sanctions if they continued to work. Those miners went
to court, and the court issued an injunction ordering the union and
its officials to stop saying that the strike was a national one.' The
officials went on their way regardless. Fines were imposed for con-
tempt of court. Mr. Scargill refused to pay his fine, but someone
else paid it for him, doubtless very much against his will. The Union
fines remained unpaid, the ultimate result of which was that its of-
ficers were replaced and the union put in the hands of a receiver
appointed by the court.6 5 It is not clear whether this receivership
made very much difference, though it must have made some.
strike was unofficial/illegal/unconstitutional, though a levy on members for that pur-
pose was not. See Hopkins v. National Union of Seamen, 1985 I.C.R. 268.
60. See Taylor, 1985 I.R.L.R. at 108.
61. M. CRICK, supra note 28, 102-08; Pead, supra note 1, at 1154; see Taylor, 1984
I.R.L.R. at 443. The requisite majority had been reduced from two-thirds to 55% in
1970 (B. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 195; M. CRICK, supra note 28, at 49) just in time
for the 1972 strike (58.8% in favour of action).
62. Beynon, litroduction to DIGGING DEEPER, supra note 13, at 13.
63. Taylor, 1984 I.R.L.R. at 444.
64. Taylor & Foulstone v. NUM (Yorkshire Area), 1984 I.R.L.R. 445 judge refused
to order the union to hold a ballot). The miners' strike of 1902-1903 was brought to an
end by a miner's lawsuit against his union for not having the requisite majority. See
Yorkshire Miners' Ass'n. v. Howden, 1905 A.C. 256; see also Denaby & Cadeby Main
Collieries v. Yorkshire Miners' Ass'n., 1906 A.C. 384, 388.
65. Clarke v. Heathfield (No. 2), 1985 I.C.R. (Ch. 606), aff'g 1985 I.C.R. 203 (C.A.).
The sequestration order, but not the receivership, was lifted on Nov. 4, 1985: The
Times (London), Nov. 15, 1985, at 1, col. 8.
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But Mr. Scargill has his own little way with the rules of law when
they conflict with what he sees as the interest of his union, as he
seems to regard it. Back in 1974 he had been irritated by some ob-
servations in the Sheffield Star about the handling of the pickets in
that year's strike, so he sued the paper for libel. After three days in
the witness box he won £3,000 which he paid to the union. But two
union members had given evidence for the defendant, and Mr.
Scargill did not like that at all. He made a report to the union stat-
ing that their conduct was detrimental to the union, chaired the
meeting which decided to charge the men, chaired the meeting
which tried them, and chaired the meeting which found them guilty
and sanctioned them. Although he did not actually vote, it was, of
course, a breach of the rules of natural justice for the prosecutor to
sit on the bench in this manner, and a contempt of court to punish
the men for evidence given in an earlier trial.66
Now I have said that the Nottinghamshire miners invoked the
law, and the Derbyshire miners did so too. Note that the law they
invoked was the common law, not the new legislation with which the
draftsman of the National Guidelines was so obsessed. There can
therefore be no argument that the strike was illegal only because
partisan and punitive laws were being resolutely opposed on
grounds of conscience. Another suit was brought by working min-
ers in South Wales who were being badly harassed by mass pickets,
and the picketing was held unlawful on the facts at common law.6 7
But did no one other than the miners themselves invoke the law
against a strike which cost billions of pounds?
The police deserve a word, though it was not the new legisla-
tion that they were enforcing: it naturally contains no criminal law.
Even so we should note that the trade unions want the next Labour
Government to abjure entirely the use of the police in industrial dis-
putes.68 I wonder who would protect the Nottinghamshire miners
then. In this strike the police arrested nearly 10,000 people and
charged nearly 8,000.69 The local magistrates could not (and in
some cases would not) cope, and stipendiaries from elsewhere had
to be sent in.7° It is also notable that despite the gravity and public-
66. See Roebuck v. NUM (Yorkshire Area) (No. 2), 1978 I.C.R. (Ch. 676), affg 1977
I.C.R. 573.
67. Thomas v. NUM (South Wales Area), [1985] 2 W.L.R. 1081 (Ch.). See Thomas &
Todd, Mass Picketing: R.I.P., 135 NEw L.J. 379 (1985).
68. 1985 POLICE REV. 1213.
69. Pead, supra note 1, at 1155.
70. Id. at 1156.
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ity of the violence, prosecutions for serious offences have been ex-
tremely unsuccessful. Take the events at the Orgreave Coke Depot.
One day at the end of May 1984 the police in riot gear clashed with
the pickets, perhaps 7,000 in number. Sixty-nine persons were in-
jured, including forty-one policemen. Eighty-two pickets were ar-
rested that day, and thirty-five the next, including Mr. Scargill
himself who spent all of seven hours in a cell. Three weeks later he
had to spend the night in hospital, one of the eighty persons
wounded in that day's work (18 June) when one hundred more ar-
rests were made. 7t The disorders were serious and notorious. Yet
in July 1985 fifteen of the accused were acquitted by a jury after a
forty-one day trial; the prosecution withdrew charges against four-
teen more the following day; and on 5 August the prosecution de-
cided to offer no evidence against a further seventy-nine. 72 The law
that people bark at does not seem to bite. Indeed, the police have
even been blamed for bringing serious charges against the pickets,
however seriously criminal their conduct.73 Perhaps the situation
will improve when the new independent prosecution service is in
operation,74 or when the Government's proposals for updating the
public order offences,7 5 as they have updated police powers,76 are
implemented. Meanwhile, it would seem that those guilty of may-
hem should be charged with obstruction and nothing more. That
was what Mr. Scargill was found guilty of at Orgreave, and fined
£250.77
But could the Government not intervene? No. It has no power
to do so. We do have provisions for emergency powers, 78 but our
71. Id. at 1154-55.
72. The Riot Charge, 135 NEW L.J. 789 (1985).
73. Id. The police have also been blamed for charging very violent pickets with con-
spiracy in addition to the main offence. See R. v. Jones, 1974 I.C.R. 310 (C.A.); 0. KAHN-
FREUND, supra note 26, at 252. The problem of securing and maintaining convictions is a
recurrent one. In 1912 the Home Secretary was forced to use the prerogative of mercy
and reduce sentence on five convicted labour leaders. R. GEARY, supra note 13, at 34. It
happened again in 1937. Id. at 132. The thirteen strikers charged with "mobbing and
rioting" at Saltley in 1972 were all acquitted. Id. at 77.
74. See Prosecution of Offenders Act, 1985, ch. 23; see also AN INDEPENDENT PROSECU-
TION SERVICE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES, CMND. 5, No. 9074 (1983).
75. REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER LAW, CMND. 5, No. 9510 (1985).
76. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60.
77. Pead, supra note 1, at 1157.
78. See Emergency Powers Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 55. Emergency powers
have been invoked nine times since 1945. R. GEARY, supra note 13, at 67. The special
emergency provisions for industrial disputes contained in the Industrial Relations Act,
1971, ch. 72, § 138, were invoked only once. in the rail strike of 1972. See C. BALFOUR,
supra note 44, at 84-86; B. WEEKES, M. MELLISH, L. DICKENS &J. LLOYD, INDUSTRIAL
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definition of emergency is narrower than yours.7 9 In any case the
powers do not include the power to order strikers back to work, not
that such powers would have been used even if they had existed,
since they would have been totally ineffectual."0 Nor, as I have said,
are the miners, though employed by a public body, public employ-
ees. Your Government, I understand, has obtained sixteen injunc-
tions since 1947,81 and actually enforces them, as the PATCO
leaders discovered in 1981,82 but our Government, very un-
characteristically, maintained a very low profile during the miners'
strike. All they did, apparently, was to wring their hands over the
violence and then put them in our pockets to pay for the police pres-
ence in areas where the local authorities were unwilling or unable to
pay for it.83
What of the employer, the National Coal Board? It started
bravely by going to court for injunctions against the flying pickets
which the Yorkshiremen were sending forth. It obtained the injunc-
tions, too. But the Union ignored them entirely, and the Coal
Board did nothing except announce with great publicity that that
was what it was going to do.8 4 What of British Steel, Mr. Mac-
Gregor's previous fief, a secondary victim whose premises were ille-
gally picketed and which says it lost £ 180 million through the strike?
Not a suit. The odd thing is that the major victims of the illegal
conduct ostentatiously refrained from invoking the new legislation
and vindicating their rights under it. It may be worth noting that
they were also nationalised industries.
RELATIONS AND THE LIMITS OF THE LAW 214-16 (1975) [hereinafter B. WEEKES]; Donald-
son, Lessons from the Industrial Court, 71 LAw Q. REV. 181, 186 (1975).
79. Our definition of emergency includes an event "on so extensive a scale as to be
calculated to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the
essentials of life .... ." Emergency Powers Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 55, § 1.
Section 2(1) specifically provides that regulations may not impose "any form of...
industrial conscription" or make it an offence for any person "to take part in a strike, or
peacefully to persuade any other person . . . to take part in a strike." Compare 29 U.S.C.
§ 178 (1982) (includes in "national emergency" a threatened or actual strike or lock-out
that affects at least a substantial part of an industry engaged in trade, commerce, trans-
portation, transmission, or communication and that would imperil national health or
safety).
80. The difficulties of implementing the law against industrial offenders were made
clear in the Betteshanger debacle in 1942. See D. MACDONALD, supra note 42, at 191.
81. See Gottlieb, The Application of Title H of the Taft-Hartley Act to the Coal Strike of 1978,
14 INDUS. & LAB. REL. F. (No. 2) 5 (1980). President Carter's request for an injunction
was refused. United States v. United Mine Workers, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3176 (1978).
82. Northrup, The Rise and Demise of PATCO, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 167 (1984).
83. Pead, supra note 1, at 1156.
84. Mcllroy, "The Law Struck Dumb?" - Labour Law and the Miners' Strike, in POLICING
THE MINERS' STRIKE 79, 83 (B. Fine & R. Miller ed. 1985).
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Suit was brought by a small private haulage company-it had
only twenty-two vehicles to start with, and some of those were unac-
countably destroyed by fire one night after the suit. Its drivers were
to haul coke being supplied by a third party to British Steel, and
were being gravely discommoded, to put it no higher, by the mass
pickets outside the steel-works. Injunctions were issued and served.
They were ignored. But these little plaintiffs persevered, and fines
of £50,000 were imposed on the South Wales Union, which showed
its contempt for the court by not even appearing at the contempt
proceedings. Sequestrators were appointed and the fines paid. But
not even these plaintiffs sought to have the officers imprisoned for
flouting the law.85
What about the courts themselves? Their position was an awk-
ward one. Their orders were being publicly flouted and the judges
themselves were the object of "critical and abusive comments. ' ' 86
The recent Vice-Chancellor was resigned about the obloquy: "For
my part I have been little affected by any such comments, apart from
feeling a somewhat mild curiosity about what will be said next."
8 7
However, he did deplore the fact that there was nothing the courts
could do proprio motu to ensue compliance with their orders. "For
the courts to say, as they often say, 'Orders of the courts must be
obeyed,' becomes idle if there are daily instances of open and noto-
rious disobedience remaining unpunished." 8 In sum, then, the law
had little effect on the strike, though the strike was designed to have
a large effect on the law. The time has come to ask why.
The answer, or part of it, seems to me to be that in England,
unlike the United States, law is not, and is not regarded as being, a
very important force in society. Lawyers there are much less in-
volved in disputes than here. They are also very much less numer-
ous. The eminence of our judges is purely social and ceremonial.
Resort to the law is reluctant, infrequent, and deplored. This is es-
pecially evident in the case of industrial disputes, but I believe that
to be simply an instance, though an obvious and important instance,
of a general view of the role of law in society.
Let me suggest the contrast between our two societies on this
point by a quotation from Henry James, as subtle a psychologist as
85. Richard Read (Transp.) Ltd. v. NUM (South Wales Area), 1985 I.R.L.R. 67, writ
discharged, The Times (London), Mar. 19, 1985, at 31, col. 4. See McIlroy, supra note 84,
at 88-89.
86. Clarke v. Chadburn, [1985] 1 W.L.R. at 83.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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he was a syntactician, whose eye and ear were as sharp as his pen
and who was marvellously familiar with the scene in his native and
adopted countries alike. Bessie Alden, a serious young lady from
Boston (a city which, James makes a New Yorker say, is so intellec-
tual that in order to enter it you must pass an examination and on
leaving it you get a kind of degree)," is cross-examining Lord Lam-
beth, the amiable and susceptible, if languid, heir to the Duke of
Bayswater.
"Lord Lambeth," said Bessie Alden, "are you an
hereditary legislator?"
"0, I say," cried Lord Lambeth, "don't make me call
myself such names as that."
"But you are a member of Parliament," said the young
girl.
"I don't like the sound of that either."
"Doesn't your father sit in the House of Lords?" Bessie
Alden went on.
"Very seldom," said Lord Lambeth.
"Is it an important position?" she asked.
"Oh dear no," said Lord Lambeth.
"I should think it would be very grand," said Bessie
Alden, "to possess simply by an accident of birth the
right to make laws for a great nation."
"Ah, but one doesn't make laws. It's a great humbug."
"I don't believe that," the young girl declared. "It must
be a great privilege, and I should think that if one
thought of it in the right way-from a high point of
view-it would be very inspiring."
"The less one thinks of it the better," Lord Lambeth
affirmed. 90
Is it perhaps "thinking of it in a high way" that leads you to
have a Law Day every year?9' Such a thing is simply unimaginable
in England where, like Lord Lambeth, we think about law as little as
possible and do not think very much of it when we do.
Let me give three instances of our reluctance to use law even
where to use it is evidently easy and appropriate. We have a Crimi-
89. H. James, An International Episode, in 4 THE COMPLETE TALES OF HENRY JAMES
243, 254 (L. Edel ed. 1962).
90. Id. at 281.
91. Law Day was first proclaimed by President Eisenhower for Feb. 7, 1958, 23 Fed.
Reg. 821 (1958), and in 1961 was moved to May 1 and rendered annual by Pub. L. No.
87-20, 75 Stat. 43, (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 164 (1982)). In Europe May 1 is Labour Day,
while in Britain they have a Bank Holiday instead.
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nal Injuries Compensation Scheme which provides compensation
from public funds for the victims of violent crime. It disburses very
large sums of money every year because there is a lot of criminal
violence these days, especially in Ulster.92 It was set up in 1964, but
it was not set up by statute or under any statute. The scheme was
drawn up by the Home Secretary and approved by the Houses of
Parliament,93 but as everyone knows that does not make a law. So
we have a text but no law. At least two disadvantages flow from this.
The first is that the text is not easy to locate.94 I am not saying that
statutory instruments, regulations, or delegated legislation are
themselves easy to locate, but at least we know in which morass to
look. Because the text of the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Scheme was not in any of the law books, because it was not law, it
filtered rather slowly into the professional consciousness and to that
extent failed to perform its apparent function. 5 Secondly, it was
perplexing for the courts to find a basis for reviewing the decisions
of the non-court which was applying this non-law.96 What difficulty
or disadvantage would there have been in putting this scheme on a
proper formal footing? None. Why was it not done? Perhaps as
Lord Lambeth said: "Ah, but one doesn't make laws. It's a great
humbug." Years later a Royal Commission was established to con-
sider the law relating to compensation for personal injury and
death. The Commission naturally approved of the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Scheme, and said in its report, rather mildly, that
perhaps the time had come to put it on a proper statutory basis. 9 7 It
is hardly necessary to state that nothing of the sort has been done.98
92. In 1982-83 the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board paid out over £29 million
to over 29,000 applicants, bringing the total paid out since 1964 to £152 million. See
CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, NINETEENTH REPORT, CMND. 5, No. 9093, at
3, 38 (1983) [hereinafter NINETEENTH REPORT]. Rather oddly, Ulster has a statutory
scheme, for which there are many precedents, such as Criminal Injuries (Ireland) Act,
1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 14, amended by Criminal Injuries (Ireland) Act, 1920, 10 & 11
Geo. 5, ch. 66.
93. 692 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 32-35 (1964).
94. See NINETEENTH REPORT, supra note 92, at 54-61; the latest modification is to be
found in HOME OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 27 (1983), in 133 NEW L.J. 253 (1983).
95. It was observed in the House of Lords that a large number of policemen apply to
the Board for compensation. 446 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 285 (1983). The reason is
that the police are informed about the Scheme and many other victims are not.
96. See R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, exparte Lain, [1967] 2 Q.B. 864.
97. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY,
REPORT, CMND. 5, No. 7054, at 329-31, esp. para. 1591 (1968).
98. See the debate on a motion (withdrawn) for legislation, at 446 PARL. DEB. H.L.
(5th ser.) 283-309 (1983), in which Lord Bridge adverted to the "really remarkable con-
stitutional anomaly inherent under present arrangements in the relationship between
the board, the courts and the executive." Id. at 297. At long last, however, it was an-
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Why formalise something that is working quite well in an informal
manner? Lawyers would see a reason for doing so. But lawyers
don't count for very much in England.
Second example. Victims of highway accidents in England get
no damages unless someone was at fault, but if anyone is at fault, we
think that victims should actually receive the damages to which they
are entitled. Thus, everyone who puts a motor vehicle on the road
is required by law to have a policy of liability insurance in an unlim-
ited amount.99 Even so, some wicked people do drive uninsured
and doubtless cause more than their proper share of accidents.
What can be done for their victims? Well, the Minister of Transport
thought it would be a good idea if they could get their money from
the insurers as a group, but the insurers thought less well of the idea
of paying out in cases where they should have received a premium
but had not. Then the Minister hinted at the possibility of legisla-
tion and the insurers promptly agreed. Their agreement was re-
corded in a letter between the Motor Insurers' Bureau and the
Minister. In this agreement the Bureau promised to indemnify
claimants under the specified conditions.'0 0 All well and good.
That seemed to save a lot of trouble. However, it is an established
rule in England, as every schoolboy knows, that if A promises B to
pay C, C cannot sue A: you have to be party to an agreement in
order to acquire any rights under it.'' Thus, the method chosen by
the Minister for granting rights to the victims of uninsured drivers
was legally incapable of having that result. So now what is to be
done? You simply ignore the law. In one case Lord Denning said:
"No point is taken by the Motor Insurers' Bureau that it is not en-
forceable by the third person. I trust that no such point will ever be
taken."' 0 2 To suppress an argument because it is clearly right is an
odd proceeding for a judge. But that odd proceeding flows from
nounced in the summer of 1986 that the Government would bring forward legislation
during the following two years.
99. Road Traffic Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, ch. 43, § 35(1), now Road Traffic Act,
1972, ch. 20, § 143.
100. The text of the agreements can be found in HEPPLE & MATrHEWS, TORT CASES
AND MATERIALS 696-700 (2d ed. 1980), or at [1964] 3 W.L.R. 450 and [1971] 3 W.L.R.
175. The original agreement was dated 17 June 1946, and was based on recommenda-
tions of a Departmental Committee REPORT, CMND. 4, No. 5528 (1937).
101. Beswick v. Beswick, 1968 A.C. 58. See Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study
of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1154 n.166 (1985).
102. Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau, [1964] 2 Q.B. 745, 757. Of the agreements
Lord Hailsham L.C. has said, "Their foundations in jurisprudence are better not ques-
tioned any more than were the demises ofJohn Doe and the behavior of Richard Roe in
the old ejectment actions." Gardner v. Moore, 1984 A.C. 548, 556.
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the odd proceeding of the Minister in choosing an informal method
of effecting his wishes instead of simply getting a law passed, as he
easily could.
Third example. All the universities in Britain except one are
publicly funded. Furthermore, the tuition fee they charge to stu-
dents is paid from public funds in respect of students who have been
resident in Britain for three years prior to matriculation.10 3 The
Government decided that it wanted foreigners to pay realistic fees,
so it told the universities to charge foreigners not less than a certain
amount. Two difficulties arose. First, it transpired that it was im-
compatible with the Treaty of Rome, with the obligations we had
assumed on entering the Common Market, to charge higher fees to
residents of France or Italy, for example, than to those of England.
Secondly, as we recently learned from a decision of the House of
Lords, it was unlawful under our Race Relations Act to charge
higher fees to anyone not resident in Britain, unless that person was
British.' °4 Now doubtless there was nothing the Minister could
have done to avoid the situation under the Treaty of Rome, since it
is a sort of Constitution, though a Constitution of rather a peculiar
sort; but he could easily have done something to avoid the illegality
of charging non-European foreigners, because the Race Relations
Act itself provides that he may render such discrimination lawful.
But in order to effect that result, he has to use juridical means, a
statute, a statutory instrument, or even a certificate of approval of
the arrangements in question.10 5 None of these was used, or used in
time. And so we have the embarrassment of a judicial decision that
doing what the government wants you to do is illegal. The reluc-
tance to do things in the proper way, the legal way, seems to be very
strong. Finally, of course, a statute had to be passed. 10 6 This time
there was no option.
Is there any explanation for this attitude to law, shared appar-
ently by legislators not related to the Duke of Bayswater? I believe
that the absence of a written Constitution counts for something
here. We have no basic text to respect or to lend respect to the
body which interprets it. "Unconstitutional" is a word we might use
to describe the miners' strike. We do not even have a Bill of Rights
103. Education (Mandatory Awards) Regs., 1985 STAT. INST. No. 1126, § 7.
104. Orphanos v. Queen Mary College, 1985 A.C. 761.
105. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, §§ 41, 69(2).
106. Education (Fees and Awards) Act, 1983, ch. 40.
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to make us conscious of our rights.'° 7 For example, in Britain the
right to strike is nowhere explicitly conferred,1 0 8 as it is in your leg-
islation and in most of the Constitutions of European states.' 0 9 We
have signed the European Convention of Human Rights, but we
have not enacted it. That is getting us into trouble with the Court in
Strasbourg, which has come close to saying that rights must be in
writing." 0 The next thing ill be for us to be told, as the German
Constitutional Court told its Parliament, that statutes must be com-
prehensible, on pain of unconstitutionality."' And that may be an-
other reason for our distaste for the law: it takes such ghastly forms.
The legislation on industrial disputes, but not it alone, is drafted in
a dauntingly inspissated manner," 2 and the decisions of the courts
are hardly such that he who runs may read them. By contrast, your
labor legislation reads quite nicely." 3 Beneath all this is an English
preference for the inexplicit, the sous-entendu, the thing understood
but not said. After all, those who like understatement might prefer
no statement at all.
The reasons for this preference may be uncertain and debata-
ble, but the fact is clear. So is another fact. We cannot go on like
this. It was all very well in a homogeneous and mutually trusting
society to dispense with the rule-book and proceed on the basis of
common understanding, but "homogeneous and mutually trusting
society" is not a description of Britain today. Nor are we an in-
dependent society any longer: our subjection to foreign courts is
bound to make us change our mores into leges as well as our yards into
metres. When things are no longer understood they must be
spelled out. And when people cannot be trusted not to abuse their
liberties, those liberties may have to be constrained. We were slow
to follow you in putting brakes on monopolists and cartelists, and
107. See L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW - THE NEW DIMENSION 76-82 (1974); M. ZANDER, A
BILL OF RIGHTS? (2d ed. 1979); J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS (1980).
108. "The freedom to strike is hidden in the interstices of procedural immunities and
privileges." 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 26, at 254. "[W]hatever may be the arguments
against a right to strike, they have yet to be convincingly made." Elias & Ewing, Economic
Torts and Labour Law: Old Principles and New Liabilities, 1982 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 358.
109. For the United States, see 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); for Europe, see Ziskin, Labor
Provisions in the Constitutions of Europe, 6 CoMP. LAB. L. 311, 361-62 (1984).
110. Malone case, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 67 (1984).
111. 5 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] no. 7 (1956)
(Apothekengesetz).
112. See the criticisms of Sir John Donaldson M.R. in Merkur Island Shipping Corp.
v. Laughton, 1983 A.C. 570, 594-95 (C.A.), approved by Lord Diplock, id. at 612.
113. The declarations of purpose and policy in American labor legislation, see, e.g., 29
U.S.C. §§ 141, 151, 171 (1982), are rather reminiscent in their stately style of an Eliza-
bethan Preamble.
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we long trusted the financiers in the city to behave like city gents,
but finally we have been forced to deploy the law. 1 4 So, too, in the
area of race relations, when it finally became clear that the "Well, it
will be best if folks just work it out" theory would not answer.' 5
But nowhere has the intervention of law been so strongly resisted as
a thing not just unnecessary or inappropriate, but as a thing actually
mischievous, as in the area of industriAl relations.
The list of those who have opposed any intervention of the law
in industrial relations is long and illustrious. Sir Winston Churchill
once said: "It is not good for trade unions that they be brought in
contact with the courts, and it is not good for the courts.l ' 1 6 The
Royal Commission on Trade Unions which reported in 1968 said:
"[I]t has been the traditional policy of the law as far as possible not
to intervene in the system of industrial relations. The evidence
which we have received shows a wide measure of agreement that this
non-intervention should continue to be the normal policy."" ' 7 The
late Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, doubtless the most revered labour law-
yer in Britain since the War, shows all the passion of a convert from
the interventionism of his native Germany when he says: "I regard
the law as a secondary force in human affairs, and especially in la-
bour relations."' SAnd from Professor Griffith of the London
School of Economics we hear the view that "industrial conflicts...
can be solved only by compromise and by the exercise of economic
and political strength, not by the application of legal principles or
guidelines."'
Not all have spoken thus. Lord Scarman, for example, has said:
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 was an attempt to
subject the power of the trade unions to the rule of law as
interpreted and applied by a court forming part of the gen-
eral legal system of the land. The unions have overthrown
it.... The challenge which faces lawyers is to win and re-
114. Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41; Financial Services Bill 1986.
115. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, extended by Race Relations Act, 1968, ch. 71,
greatly extended by Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74. For the debate on the wisdom of
the original legislation, see 711 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 926 (1965); 716 PARL. DEB.
H.C. (5th ser.) 969 (1965); 718 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 958 (1965); contrast 906 PARL.
DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1548 (1976).
116. Cited by Gould, Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain: Observations on the Industrial
Relations Act of 1971, 81 YALE L.J. 1421 n.l (1972), as being from TRADE UNION Docu-
MENTs 380 (Milne-Bailey ed. 1929).
117. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYER'S ASSOCIATIONS 1965-68,
REPORT, CMND. 5, No. 3623, at 203 (1968).
118. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 26, at 2.
119. J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY 76-77 (1977).
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tain public confidence in the law as the instrument of
control. 20
Now what is the particular difficulty in letting the law in on in-
dustrial relations, given that we are not very keen on the law at all? I
think it is this.
Unions think they have a vested right to immunity from the
law.' 2 ' Because for seventy-five years they have been free from civil
accountability for any wrong they did, they have come to think they
can do no wrong.' 2 2 They have felt free to act as they pleased be-
cause they were free from civil liability however they acted. This
immunity, or irresponsabilit, as the French might call it, stemmed
from the legislation of 1906 when unions were given total immunity
in tort and unionists were exempted from liability for specified torts
committed "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute"-
the famous golden formula which has become a sacred cow.' 23 Spo-
radic attempts were made by the courts to control unionists by in-
venting new forms of liability not covered by the specific statutory
immunities, but these were all countered by statutory amendments
passed at union insistence.' 24 The courts could, of course, do noth-
ing about the block immunity of the trade unions themselves: that
could be altered only by legislation. Furthermore, the unions were
as little bound by their word as by their acts. Collective agreements
are generally not binding in England: 2 1 it is true that they are gen-
erally barely coherent. Although the courts have sought to make the
120. L. SCARMAN, supra note 107, at 62.
121. The unions' rooted antipathy to law is demonstrated by the fact that in 1961, 44
unions out of 57 decided against having statutory protection against unfair dismissal.
Dickens, Hart, Jones & Weekes, The British Experience Under a Statute Prohibiting Unfair
Dismissal, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 497, 499 (1984).
122. The power of the trade unions is politically expressed through the Labour Party.
The unions cast 90% of the votes at the Party's Annual Conference, which formulates
Party policy; they control 18 of the 27 places on the National Executive; they sponsor
nearly half the Labour Members of Parliament; and they provide most of the Party's
finances. England & Weekes, Trade Unions and the State: A Review of the Crisis, 12 g INDUS.
REL. J. 11 (1981), reprinted in TRADE UNIONS 424 (W. McCarthy 2d ed. 1985). "[U]nion
power, even if only a modest nuisance in the 1960s, has become a major obstruction by
the early 1980s." Minford, Trade Unions Destroy a Million Jobs, 1982 J. EcON. AFF. 73,
reprinted in TRADE UNIONS 365, 368 (W. McCarthy 2d ed. 1985).
123. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47, § 3.
124. Rookes v. Barnard, 1964, A.C. 1129, countered by Trade Disputes Act, 1965, ch.
48, § 1; Torquay Hotel v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 106 (C.A.), countered by Trade Union
and Labour Relations Act, 1976, ch. 7, § 3.2; American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon, 1975
A.C. 396, countered by Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 17.2,
introduced by Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71, sched. 16, Pt. III, cl. 6, re-
pealed by Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, sched. 4.
125. Ford Motor Co. v. Amalgamated Union of Eng'g & Foundry Workers, [1969] 2
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unions behave responsibly towards their members, those attempts
have limits and have been greatly resisted.
2 6
Legislation has not been unattempted. Although the 1968 Re-
port of the Royal Commission I mentioned was very far from in-
terventionist,' 27 the Labour Government of the day very bravely
produced a much farther-reaching proposal, In Place of Strife, and
drafted legislation including a cooling-off period and actual mone-
tary penalities on unions.' 28 Union pressure and ministerial pusilla-
nimity saw to it that those proposals never became law,' 29 but the
next year Mr. Heath's proposals for the new Conservative Govern-
ment did reach the statute book. As we shall see, they did not stay
there long.
"Taft-Hartley comes to Great Britain" is the title of an article
by a leading American labor lawyer on the Industrial Relations Act
1971, which he describes as "more comprehensive than all of the
major labor legislation enacted by Congress in 1935, 1947 and 1959
viewed together . . .,, It was not only by taking us into Europe
that Mr. Heath planned to make a fundamental change in our ways.
But while he won a cash prize for his European venture, 13 1 the In-
dustrial Relations Act got him no credit at all and lost him his job.
Apart from that, it was an unmitigated disaster. It was the Law that
Failed. '3 2
Only the bare elements of such a complex enactment can be
given here.' 33 Essentially the Act contained two trade-offs. First, it
improved the position of the individual employee by protecting the
QB. 303. Relevant terms are imported into individual contracts of employment, not
without ensuing problems; see Gibbons v. Associated British Ports, 1985 I.R.L.R. 376.
126. P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, LABOUR LAw: TEXT AND MATERIALS 588-624 (2d. ed.
1984).
127. Supra note 97. Feeble regarding industrial conflict, the Commission was slightly
bolder regarding the form of collective bargaining. See P. DAVIES & M. FREEDLAND, supra
note 126, at 163-65.
128. IN PLACE OF STRIFE, A POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CMND. 5, No. 3888, at
36-37 (1969).
129. See C. BALFOUR, supra note 44, at 24-35.
130. Gould, supra note 116, at 1423. The Act is a "highly selective transplant of
American labor law." Id. at 1425. This transplantation was sternly criticised by Kahn-
Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 25-27 (1974).
131. The Freiherr von Stein Foundation Prize for 1973. 1986 WHO'S WHO? 785.
132. "In a period of little more than two years the unions had defied, defeated and
destroyed one of the most significant Acts of Parliament of the century." H. CLEGG, THE
CHANGING SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 327 (1979); B. WEEKES,
supra note 78, at 220-32, gives conclusions resulting from a study of the impact of the
Act.
133. Its main provisions are attractively compared with the American legislation in
Iserman, Labor Laws: Anglo-American Style, 58 A.B.A. J. 1054 (1972).
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employee against unfair dismissal,' 34 but imposed constraints upon
the unions. Secondly, unions that registered were given considera-
ble advantages. A registered union could have a sort of closed
shop'1 5 and be recognised as sole bargaining agent. Though it
would, like the employers, be liable monetarily for what were styled
"unfair industrial practices," this liability would be limited in
amount. Liability would be determined by a special court, 136 expert
yet perhaps sympathetic by reason of the presence of lay elements;
in the ordinary courts the immunities of the registered union and its
members would actually be increased. A union which failed to reg-
ister, on the other hand, obtained none of these advantages and was
exposed to unlimited liability for all manner of things before the
ordinary courts. 13 7 Indeed, it even forfeited the name of "trade
union." 138
But registration gave the Registrar certain powers over the un-
ions' rule-books, and this assault on their autonomy was what the
unions most resented. 139 The Trades Union Congress (TUC) there-
fore instructed its members not to register, and it cast out those who
did.' 4 ' For a time also it told its members to ignore the special
court, the National Industrial Relations Court, and all its works.' 4 '
The TUC's instruction mattered less than one might have thought,
because most employers boycotted the court as well. 14 2 But eventu-
ally there was a confrontation. Three dockers were in flagrant con-
tempt of an order of the National Industrial Relations Court. It
looked as if they would be imprisoned, as they certainly desired.
But then from the murkiest recesses of our legal lumberroom-how
wise it is never to clear out a lumberroom-there emerged a barely
134. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, §§ 22-33.
135. On the closed shop, see B. WEEKES, supra note 78, at 33-63. A full closed shop
was practised by 11 of the nationalised industries and by half of the 77 largest compa-
nies. H. CLEGG, supra note 132, at 324.
136. The National Industrial Relations Court. See Donaldson, supra note 78.
137. The disadvantages are listed in A. CAMPBELL, THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT
55-56 (1971). Full common law liability is provided for in the Industrial Relations Act,
1971, ch. 72, § 154.
138. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 61(3).
139. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 26, at 190, 212-13.
140. Thirty-two unions were suspended from the TUC for registering and twenty ex-
pelled. H. CLEGG, supra note 132, at 324.
141. C. BALFOUR, supra note 44, at 101-02.
142. "[Tlhe larger companies.., quietly ignored the Act." Id. at 5. "The law was not
extensively used during the miners dispute, not because it was not available but because
the injured parties chose not to use it." B. MCCORMICK, supra, note 16, at 223-24.
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recognisable figure, the Official Solicitor. 4 ' On behalf of the men
and against their will, the Official Solicitor appealed to the Court of
Appeal, and the Court of Appeal, under Lord Denning, held that
there was insufficient evidence that the men had picketed in breach
of the court order. 14 4 So the men did not go to prison, the Indus-
trial Relations Court was made to feel foolish, and the Court of Ap-
peal certainly seemed disingenuous.
But then came the Pentonville Five. They were actually sent to
jail.145 Mr. Wedgwood Benn spoke movingly of the Tolpuddle Mar-
tyrs of yesteryear, though they were sent rather further-to Austra-
lia-and went less eagerly. 146 A national strike was called.' 47
Matters looked grave. Then the House of Lords accelerated its de-
cision in a quite different case and held that unions, and not just the
men themselves, might be responsible under the legislation.148 By a
smart piece of doublethink the decision was taken to mean that the
men themselves were not liable and they were released with speed
from durance vile.' 49 Once again the legal system had shown more
ingenuity than integrity and the enforcement of the Act was
avoided.' 5 ° To the hatred with which the unions had always re-
garded the courts was now added unpunished contempt and conse-
quently gross ridicule.
Two days before the miners were to go on strike in 1974 the
Conservatives called a general election. They lost it. The Labour
Government, a minority government, promptly set about repealing
the Industrial Relations Act and abolishing the Court.15 ' The Con-
143. The story is told byJ.A.G. GRIFFITH, supra note 119, at 70-74; see also C. BALFOUR,
supra note 44, at 86-97.
144. Churchman v.Joint Shop Stewards' Comm., [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1094 (C.A.) (citing
the Churchman case as an example of the futility of using the weapon of imprisonment for
contempt of court in the case of industrial disputes); see also A. DENNING, DUE PROCESS
OF THE LAW 36-39 (1980).
145. See A. DENNING, supra note 144, at 39.
146. C. BALFOUR, supra note 44, at 93.
147. See L. MACFARLANE, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 151 (1981), reprinted in TRADE UNIONS
448 (W. McCarthy 2d ed. 1985).
148. Heaton's Transp. (St. Helen's) Ltd. v. Transport & General Workers' Union,
1973 A.C. 15. The liability of unions for their members' conduct was naturally unclear
because until the Act unions were not liable at all. Rules on the matter are now laid
down in the Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 15. See Clayton & Tomlinson, Vicarious
Liability and Trade Unions, 135 NEw L.J. 361, 419 (1985).
149. B. WEEKES, supra note 78, at 197-98.
150. "No official of an organisation will be sent to prison for contempt of court," said
the National Industrial Relations Court. C. BALFOUR, supra note 44, at 98, quoting The
Times (London), Nov. 13, 1972.
151. By the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, § 1. See Wedder-
burn, The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, 37 MOD. L. REV. 525 (1974).
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servatives anounced that they would not reintroduce it if re-
elected. '52 But they were not reelected. The larger Labour majority
of October 1974 was able to restore and indeed extend the immuni-
ties which trade unions and unionists had enjoyed since 1906, t5 3
while retaining and expanding the benefits which the Act had
granted to individual employees generally, 54 except in a quarrel
with a union, a matter which led to Great Britain being found in
breach of the European Convention of Human Rights. 155 With the
repeal of the legislation the non-interventionists were gleeful. Pro-
fessor Kahn-Freund said this:
The failure of the Industrial Relations Act has re-
inforced our insight that neither the legislature nor the
courts should attempt to burden the law with tasks which it
cannot fulfill .... The economic situation of the country
may compel both sides of industry to adopt policies of ad-
justment and of restraint. To these, however, the law can
make no significant contribution. 15
6
But in 1979 the Conservatives were back, radical and uncom-
promising, abrasive, strident and contestative. They did not agree
with the professor. They had a professor of their own. 1 5 7 They
152. Enter the Trendy Tartan Tories, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1974, at 35.
153. See Thomson & Beaumont, The British Labour Government's Industrial Relations Pro-
gram, 9 CORNELL U. INT'L LJ. 159 (1976); H. CLEGG, supra note 132, at 383-421. "[I]n
three recent Acts ... 1974 ... 1975 and ... 1976, Parliament conferred more freedom
from restraint on trade unions than has ever been known to the law before. All legal
restraints have been lifted so that they can now do as they will." B.B.C. v. Hearn, [1977]
1 W.L.R. 1004, 1009 (C.A.) (Lord Denning M.R.).
154. The fluctuations in policy are reflected in the changes in the period of employ-
ment that qualifies the employee for statutory protection from unfair dismissal: two
years in 1971 (Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, § 28); 26 weeks in 1975 (Trade
Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, sched. 1, cl. 10); one year in 1979 (Unfair
Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order, STAT. INST. 1979, No. 959); two years
if less than twenty employees (Employment Act, 1980, ch. 41, § 8(1)); now two years for
all employees (Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying Period) Order, STAT. INST.
1985, No. 782). See 135 NEW L.J. 1090 (1985).
155. Case of Young, James & Webster, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981). The law is
now modified by Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 7, and Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46,
§ 2.
156. 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 26, at 276. His views are appraised in B. ROSHER &
H. TEFF, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND 218-20 (1980). "Unfortunately, if the law cannot
solve such problems, there is always the danger that more authoritarian solutions will
begin to present themselves in a more favourable light." Id. at 220.
157. Namely, Professor F.A. Hayek. "There can be no salvation for Britain until the
special privileges granted to the trade unions three-quarters of a century ago are re-
voked." F. HAYEK, UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE UNIONS IN THE 1980s: THE DISTORTION OF
WAGES BY MONOPOLY IN THE LABOUR MARKET 52 (1980), quoted in Wedderburn, Labour
Law Now - A Hold and a Nudge, 13 INDUS. LJ. 73, 78 (1984).
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were determined to bring in a law. But they had learned something,
namely not to bring in a big law. So instead of a big bill there were
sporadic charges, short Acts in 1980 and 1982, and then, after their
resounding victory in 1983, another Act the following year.15 8 This
is the legislation against which the miners' strike was in part
directed.
Let us look at the position achieved by this legislation. Let me
say first what it does not do. It does not set up a special court. The
memory of the National Industrial Relations Court is too strong and
painful-perhaps especially as its President is now Master of the
Rolls, President of the Court of Appeal. 159 Nor is there any require-
ment for a union to register. This government is not so silly as to
expect cooperation from the unions. Nor are collective agreements
made binding or presumptively so. Nor is there any provision for a
forced return to work during a cooling-off period. Indeed, the pres-
ent legislation goes less far in some directions than the legislation
proposed by the Labour Government of 1970.160
What the recent legislation does is this. 16 1 First, the blanket
immunity of trade unions is abolished. They can now be sued and
enjoined. 162 Their liability in damages is limited in proportion to
their membership-up to £250,000 in the case of the largest un-
ions-and certain funds may not be attached; 163 but of course their
monetary liability in respect of legal costs or fines for contempt of
court is unlimited."6 Secondly, although the protection of union-
ists for conduct "in contemplation of furtherance of a trade dispute"
(the golden formula) is retained in terms, it is substantially qualified.
First, the definition of "trade dispute" is very much narrowed so as
to include only a dispute which is between workers and their own
employer and which relates wholly or mainly to specified matters.
Sympathy strikes and political strikes attract no protection.16 5 Next,
even where there is a trade dispute as so narrowly defined, secon-
dary action is protected only within certain limits.166 Picketing else-
158. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42; Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46; Trade Union Act,
1984, ch. 49.
159. Lord Donaldson M.R. has given his views on the National Industrial Relations
Court in Donaldson, supra note 78.
160. See the proposals in IN PLACE OF STRIFE, supra note 128.
161. Negatively appraised by Wedderburn, supra note 157.
162. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 15.
163. Id. §§ 16-17.
164. Dimbleby & Sons v. Nat'l Union ofJournalists, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 427, 431 (H.L.)
(Lord Diplock).
165. Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46, § 18.
166. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 17.
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where than at one's own place of work is unprotected,167 though
protection is not actually required unless the picketing constitutes a
nuisance or other common law wrong.16 Finally, provision is made
for ballots, both for union offices and for industrial action. 169 In
particular, before any conduct in an official strike is protected there
must have been a ballot with a majority in favour of it.170 Public
money is made available to defray the cost of these ballots.' 7 '
This, then, is the legislation which is thought to be a wicked,
wanton, and brutal attack on the natural rights of trade unions. Yet
in most countries trade unions have no greater rights than this legis-
lation leaves them. It was the prior position in Britain which was
quite exceptional, not the present one. While it is natural to howl
and stamp if a privilege is taken away, one cannot expect much sym-
pathy if the privilege is an unjustified or obsolete one. Perhaps most
people in Britain not obsessed with hatred of the present regime
would think the present position fair enough. But of course the
question is not whether the law is fair. The question is whether it
will be accepted. It is not enough to say "Fiat lex."
One hopeful sign is that employers are beginning to use the
legislation, to invoke the courts, and to obtain orders for fines and
damages.' 72 One can only get used to court orders if court orders
are issued, and they will only be issued if they are sought. After all,
167. Id. § 16.
168. Thomas v. NUM (South Wales Area), [1985] 2 W.L.R. 1081, 1106-07, disapprov-
ing the judgment of Forbes, J., in Hubbard v. Pitt, 1976 QB. 142, aff'd on other grounds,
1976 QB. 142, 171 (C.A.), that picketing except in pursuance of a trade dispute is ipso
facto illegal as an obstruction of the highway. Pickets may not, however, stop vehicles.
Broome v. D.P.P., 1974 A.C. 587.
169. Trade Union Act, 1984, ch. 49, § 20.
170. See id. § 10.
171. Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 1.
172. See Evans, supra note 17, and now Austin Rover Group v. Amalgamated Union of
Eng'g Workers (TASS), 1985 I.R.L.R. 162. When the two main railway unions had a
one-day strike in support of the miners, British Rail, the employer, demanded that they
pay £200,000 compensation. The Times (London), June 8, 1985, at 1, col. 6. The La-
bour Research Department has traced 70 actions at law brought by employers against
trade unions and their members in the four and one-half years to August 1985, half of
them in the last eighteen months. The Times (London), Oct. 7, 1985, at 3, col. 1(3).
That the NLRB has 60,000 cases a year astonishes the English reader. See Verkuil, Vhose
Common Law for Labor Relations?, 92 YALE L.J. 1409, 1414 (1983) (replying to Epstein, A
Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE LJ. 1357
(1983)). During the life of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, only 33 employers "ap-
plied to the NIRC for relief fr-om industrial action or its threat," B. WEEXES, supra note
78, at 217, and only one case reached ajudgment for damages, paid after sequestration
of the contemptuous union's assets by an anonymous donor. TRADE UNIONS, supra note
122, at 470. Of course, the number of cases of unfair dismissal is quite large: in 1983
the industrial tribunals dealt with 37,158 appeals, applications, and references under
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for only three years in the past eighty have unions been subject to
court orders. They are not used to the process, but perhaps they
will become so, if time permits. Secondly, there are some parts of
the legislation that the present Labour leadership would like to re-
tain. Of course the good bits of the Industrial Relations Act were
retained, too, but here we are talking of the provisions regarding
ballotting, and those the unions do not care for. And it is not at all
certain that a Labour Government, much less a coalition govern-
ment excluding the Conservatives, would defer to union wishes on
all points. The shiftless and shifty Labour Government of 1974-
1978 was certainly spineless on this matter, but its predecessor had
had the nerve at least to propose legislation undesired by the un-
ions, if not the will to enact it.
The unions, of course, are adamant against the legislation, as
we have seen. The Trades Union Congress, not finding much not to
cooperate with, has instructed its members not to take the free
money made available for the statutory ballots, and proposes to cast
out the quite powerful unions which have done so.173 The demands
for the repeal of this legislation are vociferous, all the more so since
the demands for the repeal of the previous legislation were effective.
Even on the union front, however, there is a glimmer of hope. First,
the unions themselves are readier than they were to invoke the law.
They had great fun going to court to embarrass the government
over the GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) af-
fair, when Mrs. Thatcher told the union members at the high secur-
ity government communications headquarters to quit their union or
leave the premises: of course those people really were public em-
ployees, even in our understanding, but it is a matter on which the
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has yet to speak. 174 Secondly,
the Trades Union Congress has agreed to try to work out a "positive
legal framework" within which it would be possible for them to work
employment protection legislation. COUNCIL ON TRIBUNALS, 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORT,
H.C. PAPER No. 42 (1984).
173. By the Wembley Resolution of 1980 the TUC instructed member unions wholly
to boycott the recent legislation. Benedictus, Collective Labour Law: Industrial Action, 135
NEW L.J. 746, 747 (1985).
174. See Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 A.C.
374 (another instance of the troublesome consequences of informal methods of pro-
ceeding). Fentiman regards as very significant that the NUM, which did not appear in
court when sued, itself went to court onJuly 11, 1985, to seek (unsuccessfully) an injunc-
tion to prevent the Nottinghamshire miners from seceding and forming their own break-
away union. NUM had already gone to court on December 19, 1984, to try to stop a
preliminary move toward secession. Pead, supra note 1, at 1157; Fentiman, supra note 1,
at 89.
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under a Labour administration. 75
That is hopeful. But it would not do to be very hopeful. At the
same meeting, the Congress voted for certain motions moved by the
National Union of Mineworkers.176 The motions were, first, that all
sums paid by the union by way of fines and costs should be re-
funded-i.e., that they should get back what they lost; and, sec-
ondly, so that they may now have what they failed to gain, that no pit
be closed until it is physically exhausted. This makes one reflect on
the status of a victory when the victors will not claim it and the
losers will not admit defeat.
175. The Times (London), Aug. 24, 1985, at 30, col. 1.
176. And Now for Pandora's Ballot Box, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 1985, at 61-62.
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